Essential Diplomacy on 2 Fronts: Israel–Lebanon Talks Reshape As Iran Courts Gulf States
With negotiations between the United States and Iran slowly making progress, Iran began efforts to talk with Gulf states over the Strait of Hormuz in accordance with Clause 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding. The Lebanese and Israeli governments, with the United States support in mediation, work towards security handover as the week comes to a close. Regional diplomacy and the conflict in southern Lebanon are now tightly connected, with their impact on the Middle East still unfolding.
Building Commitment: Security Agreements
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reportedly met with the Sultan of Oman in Muscat on June 23, 2026, according to a post by the Revolutionary Guard News Channel on Telegram, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) cited. The ISW noted a post on June 23, 2026, made by the Foreign Ministry of Oman on X, a joint statement reaffirming the commitment of Iran and Oman to implement clause 5, specifying how the strait will be overseen, safe passage per international law, and how maritime support functions will be provided in the future, alongside other members of the Persian Gulf.
The ISW cited Fars News reporting that they agreed to continue communicating the manner of administration, maritime services, and related service fees. The ISW cited a post on X made on June 22, 2026, by Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, noting that after talks with Iran, he said that Oman supports toll-free safe passage along the international waterway. Reporting from CNN, which corroborated statements from President Donald Trump on Truth Social on June 23, 2026, the ISW noted that maritime data showed increased traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The ISW cited Fars News, claiming that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy was allowing ships to transit based on coordination with the IRGC.
A report by Mehr News, cited by the ISW, revealed that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi coordinated with Saudi Arabia’s top diplomat, Faisal bin Farhan, on fostering closer diplomatic ties on June 24, 2026. The ISW noted Defa Press coverage of the Parliaments of the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (PUIC) on June 24, 2026, where Ghalibaf said Iran is ready to form security agreements with Gulf states anchored in economic cooperation. The ISW cited a release by the Iran Labor News Agency that highlighted comments by Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, Supreme National Defense University President, that Iran’s objective is to strengthen relations with its Gulf neighbors in a speech on June 24, 2026.
Opening Diplomacy: Reshaping Gulf Relations
Citing the Financial Times, the ISW noted that Qatar’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani, said Qatar is open to talks on how it can work with Iran’s plan to oversee the Strait alongside Oman and its neighbors, but rejects any implementation of a toll fee. The ISW cited a Reuters report revealing that Qatari officials met with Omani officials in Muscat on June 24, 2026, saying that talks covered negotiations with Iran, Iraq, and neighbors along the Strait of Hormuz. According to Reuters, the current plan is to secure no transit fees, though Iran could request environmental, navigation, and security fees during the talks.
Citing an X post by a correspondent at i24 News on June 24, 2026, the ISW noted that a diplomat told Agence France-Presse that Saudi Arabia will host a summit to restore relations between Iran and neighboring Gulf states, operating separately from the United States-Iran Memorandum of Understanding. The ISW cited an X post by Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei, on June 24, 2026, stating that partnerships between the United States and neighboring Gulf states fuel instability in the region. The post by Baghaei added that the United States military’s interference in the Middle East will keep peace from being achieved.
Bloomberg, referenced by the ISW, reported that Iranian officials met with United Arab Emirates officials following multiple Iranian requests to reestablish relations.
Clashing Resolve: Assets and Objectives
United States involvement in Iran’s use of unfrozen assets was rejected on June 23, 2026, by Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Ali Bahreini, according to Reuters, which the ISW cited. Tasnim News published an interview with Iran’s Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, which the ISW cited, in which Hemmati said Iran is under no obligation to purchase agricultural products from the United States under the Memorandum of Understanding.
The ISW noted a Telegram post on June 22, 2026, from Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei outlined Iran’s key objectives: ending U.S. military activity against Iran, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, affirming Iranian authority over the Strait of Hormuz, obtaining U.S. compensation for reconstruction, removing all sanctions, resolving nuclear‑related issues, and gaining access to frozen assets.
Deconfliction: LAF Pilot Zones
The ISW noted that CENTCOM spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins told CNN on June 23, 2026, that CENTCOM is monitoring combat activity in Lebanon through the newly formed deconfliction cell to facilitate tactical deconfliction during the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. A post on X by a diplomatic correspondent, cited by the ISW, expressed concerns from Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Yechiel Leiter, as to Iran’s position within the deconfliction cell. Of the concerns noted, Lebanon and United States officials were directly addressed as to the failure of negotiations on lowering risks of Hezbollah attacks, likening the situation to a train being derailed.
An X post on June 23, 2026, by a military correspondent for Kann News was cited by the ISW, informing that the fifth round of negotiations, mediated by the United States, had begun. The ISW noted further statements from Times of Israel, Reuters, and the outlet Mako, reporting that negotiations between Israel and Lebanon were likely to expand through June 25, 2026. These talks were reported to cover measures to ensure the ceasefire, such as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) replacing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon.
The ISW cited reporting on June 24, 2026, from Reuters and Y Net News indicating Israeli and Lebanese negotiations, backed by the United States, would result in the deployment of United States-trained and vetted LAF units to take over IDF positions. Reuters’ report specifically highlighted remarks from the United States Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, stating the United States would assist in enhancing the LAF’s capability to clear and maintain control of areas in southern Lebanon.
Constructing the Timeline: Releasing Lebanon
According to MTV Lebanon, cited by the ISW, unspecified United States sources said on June 23, 2026, that the Lebanese government proposed the IDF release territory in Beaufort Castle, Nabateih District, as part of the pilot zone efforts; however, Israel wants to complete an assessment of danger from Hezbollah before withdrawing. The ISW noted, based on Reuters reporting on June 24, 2026, Israeli and Lebanese plans on the pilot zones will not be announced until the conclusion of negotiations on June 25, 2026.
According to ISW’s notes, Israeli media reported that the IDF is preparing to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon, facilitating the pilot zones to be taken over by the LAF. The ISW highlighted that the IDF previously transferred control of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, on June 4, 2026, to the joint operation of the LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Citing Al-Manar and Samer Al-Haj Ali, the ISW noted that the Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem issued statements on June 23, 2026, affirming Hezbollah’s cooperation with the LAF and that Lebanon should take advantage of Hezbollah’s cooperation as a partner force.
Strikes and Violations
Reporting from the IDF on X, which the ISW noted, showed tactical strikes on June 23, 2026, against a group of Hezbollah members near Ali al Taher as they approached the IDF’s position. The spokesperson to the IDF further posted on X, cited by the ISW, sharing information on drone strikes near IDF positions in Ali al Taher that targeted four Hezbollah fighters who reportedly were operating under civilian cover on June 23, 2026. The ISW noted Military Media in the Islamic Republic of Lebanon (mmirleb) reporting from June 23, 2026, claiming the IDF struck civilians as bodies were recovered and roads cleared, calling it a violation of the ceasefire established on June 19, 2026.
The ISW cited the Financial Times, which said Thani made statements on June 24, 2026, noting ceasefire violations will be a core element of the deconfliction cell. Based on IDF reports on X posted June 24, 2026, the ISW noted two Hezbollah fighters were killed as they advanced on the IDF near Ali al Taher. Another IDF post on X on June 24, 2026, showed a strike on Hezbollah members moving toward IDF positions in a vehicle in Ali al Taher; the ISW cited a Haaretz report that stated Israeli intelligence said IDF soldiers had no updates on the deconfliction mechanisms or the role they may play in Lebanon.
A report by Middle East Eye on June 24, 2026, which the ISW cited, Ghalibaf continued to stand firmly that the agreement with the United States can only be complete once Israel withdraws from Lebanon. The ISW noted that Haaretz published statements from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 24, 2026, that the IDF would remain in southern Lebanon and maintain the security zone while he is in office.
The State of Iraq: Disarmament Situation
The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Sadegh, had an interview published by the Iraqi News Agency, noted by the ISW, where Sadegh claimed Iran respects decisions made by the Iraqi government. This statement was about Iraq’s militia disarmament, calling it an Iraqi matter, while a separate June 10, 2026, report by Alhurra, quoted IRGC officials as saying Iran saw disarmament as being against the Axis of Resistance. During the interview, Sadegh also claimed Iran did not seek intervention during the war, despite eight Iraqi sources telling Reuters on June 19, 2026, that the IRGC created covert Iraqi cells reporting directly to the IRGC.
