Prominent Memorandum of Understanding Leak Fuels Rumors and Diplomatic Uncertainty
Following recent escalations in which the United States struck Iranian military sites and Iran responded with regional drone and missile attacks, the conflict shifted into a tense diplomatic phase. As Iran’s draft Memorandum of Understanding began circulating across state and semi‑official outlets, both Iran and the United States signaled interest in negotiations even as nuclear concerns, maritime enforcement actions, and expanding fronts in Lebanon underscored how fragile the moment remained.
Leaked: Memorandum of Understanding Hits The Rumor Mill
According to records from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), several Telegram outlets, including Mehr News, Tasnim News, and the Iranian Republic News Agency, as well as Nour News’ website, released a version of the United States-Iran Memorandum of Understanding on June 12, 2026. Based on Mehr News’ release, it highlights a 14-point text, with key demands from Iran highlighted: the end of the war on all fronts, including Lebanon; Iran maintaining the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) over the waterway; releasing Iran’s frozen assets; and the United States funding the reconstruction of damage caused by the war.
Tasnim News confirms that the Memorandum of Understanding exists, but it does not say anything is official or set in stone. The Iranian Republic News Agency likewise confirms the existence of the Memorandum of Understanding, highlighting control of the strait, ending the war, releasing assets, and war compensation, but adopts a cautious tone, focusing on its effects on Iran, emphasizing three issues to be negotiated over sixty days. NourNews touches on the agreement, but it reads as hopeful speculation about the prospect of negotiations and emphasizes that no version had been officially approved.
The ISW cited a post on X from Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in which he called for media outlets to avoid speculation regarding the Memorandum of Understanding’s complete text. The ISW also noted a post on Truth Social by President Donald Trump less than an hour after, with a screenshot of Araghchi’s statement. In contrast, the ISW highlighted Iranian Parliamentarian Mahmoud Nabavian, whom it identifies as a member of Paydari Front, as opposing the Memorandum of Understanding on X.
Open Talks: Discussion of the Agreement
ISW’s June 13, 2026 update, Araghchi had an interview that NourNews covered, discussing the Memorandum of Understanding on June 12, 2026. In the interview, Araghchi said the agreement could change; currently there are two parts to it: first stage dealing with ending the war on all fronts, resumption of traffic through the international waterway, economic benefits for Iran, including funds for rebuilding after war damages, relief from sanctions, releasing Iran’s frozen assets, and ending the United States blockade on Iranian ports.
The second stage, according to the interview, would cover issues related to the nuclear programs, with one or two other issues not discussed at length. One of the issues discussed at length was the Strait and joint operations between Iran and Oman having sovereignty, stating both countries would collect fees once the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, though Araghchi specified that Iran would oversee the management of the Strait. Also mentioned during the interview was safe passage being guaranteed by Iran for civilian vessels, though military ships would require separate arrangements.
Big Changes: Uranium Locked Away
The ISW cited a post by President Donald Trump on Truth Social reiterating the United States firm stance on Iranian uranium, claiming there will be no nuclear weapon and that Iran no longer wanted one on June 13, 2026. He further said the United States looks forward to working with the Middle East in the future. According to CNN, which the ISW cited, five sources familiar with United States intelligence say that Iran has been escalating efforts to seal off its highly enriched uranium in recent weeks, including collapsing tunnels and setting booby-traps at the entrances to highly enriched uranium storage areas with explosive mines.
Differences Between Nations
The Wall Street Journal, which the ISW cited, further noted that unspecified mediators reported that neither the Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei nor the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has approved the latest Memorandum of Understanding. Citing a CNN report, the ISW took note of statements by a senior administration official for Trump saying the agreement included Iran ceasing the nuclear program and no further funding to the Axis of Resistance. According to the ISW, another United States official stated similar commitments from Iran to ABC, stating it was agreed that the nuclear program would be dismantled.
Contrasting reports from United States outlets and Iranian media highlight nuclear concessions; the ISW cited a post on X by Vice President JD Vance announcing that economic relief will begin once Iran fulfills its obligations, stating frozen assets would not be immediately released once the Memorandum of Understanding is signed. The ISW referenced reporting from Axios, citing an unnamed diplomat from a mediating country who stated that Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz by eliminating tolls and restoring pre‑war shipping volumes within thirty days under the Memorandum of Understanding.
The ISW cited reports on X and PressTV highlighting Iran firing drones on commercial vessels attempting to move through international waters, with United States forces intercepting two Iranian one-way attack drones attacking ships in the strait. According to the ISW, Iranian media outlet Mehr News reported that explosions near Qeshm and Sirik islands were the result of warning shots fired by Iranian forces to enforce control over the strait.
According to the ISW coverage, outlets Tabnak and Asriran argued on June 13, 2026, that while there is an agreement between the United States and Iran, it only aims to end the war; it is not a solution to the underlying problems between the two countries, and the Memorandum of Understanding is only a delay before the final display, giving both sides time to ready themselves for the larger disagreements to be settled on the battle field.
Southern Lebanon Scuffle: Advancing Beyond The Yellow Line
According to the ISW, Military Media in the Islamic Resistance of Lebanon (mmirleb) reported that between June 11, 2026, and June 12, 2026, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) advanced on Majdal Zoun, Tyre District. Hezbollah used a variety of weapons to defend against the advancement, such as mortars, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rockets, improvised explosive devices (IED), and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Based on ISW coverage, mmirleb claimed to defend against the IDF in recent weeks in response to the IDF moving beyond the yellow line across southern Lebanon, as evidenced in previous reporting on June 11, 2026, when members were waiting for leaders to decide what to do.
Citing Reuters and the Israeli outlet, Mako, the ISW noted that the IRGC reorganized Hezbollah’s command-and-control structure, shifting from a hierarchical model to a decentralized system to increase unit-level autonomy and mobility. The Mako report said an IDF officer stated on June 11, 2026, that this restructuring emphasized independent decision-making by combat units rather than reliance on senior-level direction. The ISW assessed that this could enable Hezbollah to conduct more flexible defensive operations in southern Lebanon, similar to the group’s structure during the 1990s and the 2006 war.
The ISW cited a post on X by the IDF stating that it had killed at least ten field commanders from Hezbollah responsible for activities in areas across southern Lebanon since March 2026.
Strikes Resume: Northern Israel
The IDF reported through X, noted by the ISW, that on June 12, 2026, Hezbollah struck a military zone with a drone between Adamit and Aramshe, northern Israel. This was followed by another drone strike that crossed between Metula and Misgav Am on June 13, 2026. While there were no reports of significant damage or harm, the ISW cited Hezbollah claims through the mmirleb Telegram channel that it launched a strike on the IDF Jal al Deir position in northern Israel with two fixed-wing drones on June 12, 2026.
Hezbollah continued to claim attacks through the mmirleb Telegram channel, cited by the ISW, using rockets and first-person view (FPV) drones on advancing IDF forces in Majdal Zoun on June 13, 2026. The ISW cited coverage from Saudi media outlet Asharq Al-Awsat where local sources said the IDF advanced to the outskirts of Majdal Zoun, striking Hezbollah targets with airstrikes and artillery to support the advancement on the town.
According to ISW’s reporting, a senior Lebanese military official told the Associated Press that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) withdrew from barracks in Kfar Tebnit when the IDF issued a warning to evacuate the area, and the IDF began operating there. Multiple sources on X were cited by the ISW stating on June 13, 2026, that the IDF established positions near Ali al Taher Hill and Kfar Tebnit.
The Iraqi Militia: Bringing Outside Military Factions Into The Fold
According to reports from the ISW, citing Alhurra, Iran views the Iraqi federal government’s recent disarmament push as directly tied to the Axis of Resistance dynamics, not an internal Iraqi matter. Alhurra reported an Iraqi federal government source saying the IRGC informed militia leaders that Iran will keep the militias armed and warned Iraqi leaders that the weapons belong to Iran, not the Iraqi state. The report added that the IRGC told militia leaders they had no right to surrender weapons to the Iraqi federal government, with some unspecified Iraqi militia leaders facing extreme Iranian pressure to discourage them from shifting toward political participation.
